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Abstract Presentists face a challenge from truthmaker theory: if you hold that the
only existing objects are presently existing objects and, moreover, you agree that truth
supervenes on being, then you will be hard pressed to identify some existent on which
a given true but traceless claim about the past supervenes. Cameron (Philos Books
49:292–301, 2008, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, In: D Zimmerman (ed), 2011)
aims to meet this challenge by appeal to distributional properties. So, to give a simple
example, the truth that you were once a child supervenes on you presently instantiating
the property of being initially a child and then an adult, a property distributed over
time. I argue that a presentist ought to deny that distributional properties can serve as
truthmakers.
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1 Introduction
Presentists face a challenge from truthmaker theory. Roughly, the challenge is this: sup-
pose you hold that only the present time exists, the only existing objects are presently
existing objects and the only instantiated properties are presently instantiated proper-
ties. Moreover, you agree that truth supervenes on being, so there are no changes in
the truths without changes in what exists or what is instantiated. Then you will be hard
pressed to identify some object or property on which a given true claim about the past
supervenes. Cameron (2008, 2011) aims to meet this challenge by appeal to distrib-
utional properties. Such properties, first discussed by Parsons (2004), are distributed
over an extension: for example, being polka-dotted red on white is a property distrib-
uted over a spatial surface; and being initially a child and then an adult is a property
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distributed over time. Cameron holds that temporal distributional properties can serve
as presently instantiated truthmakers for past truths. So, to give a simple example, the
truth that you were once a child supervenes on you presently instantiating the property
of being initially a child and then an adult. I shall argue that a presentist ought to
deny that distributional properties can serve as presently existing truthmakers for past
claims.
2 The challenge
I begin by unpacking the challenge that presentists face from truthmaker theory. This
will be a familiar story to many readers but some care here will pay dividends down
the road. Consider the following two theses.
presentism Everything is present.
truthmaker Truth supervenes on being.
The intuition driving presentism is that the past was but no longer is. The future
will be but is not yet. And similarly for objects existing, and properties instantiated,
at a time: Caesar existed but does not now exist, and so does not exist simpliciter. So
only the present time exists, the only objects that exist are presently existing objects,
and the only instantiated properties are those presently instantiated.1 presentism is
opposed to such positions as eternalism, the view that all three of the past, present and
future exist (or, again, that past, present and future objects all exist), and the growing
block theory of time, according to which just the past and present exist (or just past
and present objects exist).
The leading idea of truthmaker theory is that what truths there are depends on the
way the world is. The original truthmaker theorists such as Armstrong (1997) viewed
truthmaking in terms of necessitation: for any true proposition, there is an entity the
existence of which suffices for the proposition to be true. But true non-existence
claims such as ‘There are no unicorns’ do not appear to need an existing entity to be
true. In response to such objections, Bigelow (1988, pp. 130–133) for example claims
merely that truth supervenes on being. Were ‘There are no unicorns’ false, there
would be corresponding differences in ontology. Supervenience is arguably too weak
to capture the sense in which an ontology grounds truths.2 However, the weakness of
Truthmaker is an advantage for us: if Presentism is inconsistent with it, then it is
of course inconsistent with stronger formulations of the truthmaker intuition cashed
out in terms of necessitation or grounding. I have left Truthmaker underspecified,
since differences in formulation between, say, global and local supervenience claims
will not affect my argument.
1 For the characterization of presentism in terms of the existence of times, see for example Armstrong
(2004, p. 145) and Bourne (2006, p. 13). For the characterization in terms of presently existing objects, see
for example Merricks (1995, p. 523), Mellor (1998, p. 20) and Sider (2001, p. 11). presentism is vacuously
true if the copula in the slogan is present tensed: everything that presently exists is present. For the slogan
to state a substantive thesis, we must take the copula to refer to existence simpliciter. For discussion of
triviality in the formulation of presentism, see Lombard (1999), Crisp (2004) and Meyer (2005, 2012).
2 And recently some have offered alternative ways to handle negative existential truths: see, for example,
Schaffer (2008, 2010).
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There is a prima facie tension between presentism and truthmaker. Take, for
example, a true claim about the past, such as the claim that dinosaurs roamed the
earth.3 Has the presentist available to her a supervenience base for this truth? Suppose
for illustration that truths supervene on obtaining states of affairs. Under an attractive
view of states of affairs, the past state of affairs that dinosaurs roamed the earth is
composed of the dinosaurs themselves and a property of earth-roaming. As such, the
state of affairs is itself not presently existing and so, according to the presentist, does
not exist. (Similar problems arise for alternative truthmaker candidates.) Some past
truths have traces, evidence of those truths. For example, the claim that dinosaurs
roamed the earth has traces in the fossil record. However, truths do not supervene on
traces, since different past events might have resulted in the same traces. And, for
many truths about the past, there are no longer any traces. So traces cannot provide
truthmakers for past claims.
Some presentists respond that there are nonetheless presently existing facts or
presently instantiated properties that can serve as a supervenience base for past truths.
To continue our example, one might hold that there is a present fact that the world con-
tained dinosaurs; or one might hold that the world currently instantiates the property
of having previously contained dinosaurs. Following Bigelow (1996), call these brute
tensed facts or properties Lucretian. Lucretian facts or properties appear to provide
presently existing truthmakers for past claims.
The appeal to Lucretian facts or properties, however, has struck some as a cheat.
Sider (2001, p. 41), for example, holds that tensed facts are hypotheticals but truthmak-
ers must be categorical or occurrent, writing: “[w]hether the world has the property
previously containing dinosaurs is not a matter of what the world itself is like, but points
beyond itself, to the past.” How might we develop this prohibition against cheating
so to formulate a condition of adequacy for any proposed supervenience base for past
truths? The demonstrative imagery in Sider’s characterization is evocative but it should
not be taken literally. A property merely pointing beyond its instances cannot be the
target. For such a requirement wrongly would label legitimate properties as cheaters. If
pointing is demonstrative, for example, then the formulation would view many demon-
strative properties as cheaters. Except for the special case of de se demonstration, where
the demonstrator and that demonstrated are one and the same, demonstrative proper-
ties point beyond their instances. But to preclude demonstrations is not the intention
of those who endorse a prohibition against cheating. So we must take talk of pointing
as metaphorical and at best an intuitive first stab at a prohibition against cheating.
One way of cashing out the prohibition is to draw on the distinction between hypo-
thetical and categorical properties. However, the hypothetical–categorical distinction
is but an example of cheating in a certain context. Sider (2001, pp. 40–41) does not
claim that hypothetical properties such as dispositions are cheaters, but only that they
are cheaters if one is committed to categoricity. For example, brute dispositions are
cheaters only if one already holds that “a proper ontology should invoke only cate-
gorical, or occurrent, properties and relations.” Sider (2001, p. 41) is explicit on this
3 For the most part, I shall restrict discussion to the presentist view that the past does not exist. This
simplification serves my purposes, avoids irrelevant complications concerning the future, and distinguishes
presentism from growing block theorists such as Tooley (1997).
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point: “the argument against presentism is not strictly tied to the hypothesis that non-
categoricity is to blame. The argument without this claim would simply be that the
presentist’s primitive tenses [or tensed properties] share some unspecified negative
feature with the rejected ontologies.”
What then is it for a property to illegitimately point beyond its instances? Here’s a
suggestion. Suppose that we had a full description of the present, a complete list of
the world’s intrinsic properties. Would removing a given Lucretian property, such as
the property of having previously contained dinosaurs, make a difference to this list?
If not, then such properties are dismissible. Following this line of thought, we might
place the following condition on truthmaking:
difference- making Any legitimate truthmaker or supervenience base for truths
makes a difference to the intrinsic nature of the world.
For the interpretation of Truthmaker in terms of difference making, see for example
Lewis (2001) and, for the suggestion of restricting the requirement of difference mak-
ing to intrinsic natures, see Cameron (2011). difference- making isn’t the only way
of interpreting the demonstrative imagery in the Sider quotation, and I shall consider
later the adequacy of the condition as a prohibition against cheating. For now however,
let us take difference- making as a working proposal.
One last observation. I shall assume that there are truths about the past. That is, I
assume
past realism Some claims about the past are true.
past realism is intuitively attractive. Indeed, the move of denying that claims about
the past are true is anathema to many. Dummett (2004, p. 44), for example, calls the
view “repugnant.” And Armstrong (1997, p. 145) tells us that “[s]urely there are truths
about the past…. Only a very extreme sceptic could call this truth into question.” There
have been, however, serious attempts to reject past realism. Markosian (2004), for
example, holds that past claims are untrue and, drawing on Sider’s (1999) notion of
quasi-truth, that they are quasi-true or false for only philosophical reasons. And, as I
shall note in Sect. 7, some variants of presentism also reject past realism. For the
moment, however, these moves need not concern us. For of course, the tension between
presentism and truthmaker, and the strategy to resolve this tension by appealing
to distributional properties, only arises under the assumption of past realism.
We have then a prima facie tension among presentism, truthmaker, past
realism and difference- making. In response, some reject or restrict truthmaker:
see for example, Merricks (2007). Others reject presentism: see for example, Sider
(2001). And still others attempt a reconciliation. These authors attempt to show that
presentism, truthmaker, past realism and difference- making (or some other
variant on a prohibition against cheating) are consistent. One recent reconciliatory
strategy appeals to distributional properties.
3 Distributional properties
Certain properties are distributional. For example, being red all over is a property
which, when instantiated, is uniformly distributed over a surface. Other distributional
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properties are non-uniform. For example, being polka-dotted red on white is a colour
property which, when instantiated, is non-uniformly distributed over a surface. Being
hot on one end and cold on the other is a temperature property distributed over a
solid.
It may seem that non-uniform distributional properties are equivalent to a set or
arrangement of non-distributional or uniform distributional properties. Consider being
polka-dotted red on white. Parts of the surface are red and other parts, white. The
surface is polka-dotted but, it may well seem, not in virtue of having some property
over and above being red and white in a certain way. For one might think of the parts
of the surface that are wholly red as having the uniform distributional property of
being red all over and the parts of the surface that are wholly white as having the
uniform distributional property of being white all over. Indeed, when we go down to
point-sized parts of the surface, we reach non-distributional properties of being red
and being white. So the property of being polka-dotted red on white is equivalent to
the non-distributional properties of being red and being white, along with a certain
arrangement or spatial relationship.
Parsons (2004) however argues that at least some non-uniform distributional prop-
erties are irreducible—that is to say, some are not necessarily co-extensive with non-
distributional or uniform distributional properties. Consider a cloth that is red on the
left edge, blue on the right edge and varies continuously from the one colour to the
other through a spectrum of purples. The cloth is dark on the top edge and pale on
the bottom edge and varies continuously in tint from dark to pale across its surface.
So the cloth has the distributional property of ranging through a continuous spectrum
between dark red on one corner and pale blue on the other corner. Every extended
part of the cloth has a non-uniform distribution of colours or tints. One might attempt
to offer a reduction similar to the one offered above for the property of being polka-
dotted red on white. The spectral distribution then would be explicated in terms of an
arrangement of non-distributional properties: the cloth is a specific red at one point, a
specific purple at another point, and so on.
The alleged reducibility of this distributional property appears to depend on there
being unextended parts of the cloth. (I shall modify this claim later.) The reduction thus
requires that the cloth not be composed of gunk. Any part of gunk has itself proper parts.
So gunk is divisible all the way down: gunk is not composed of mereological atoms.
For the classic discussion of gunk, see Lewis (1991). Were the cloth spatially gunky,
we would never reach points possessing the non-distributional properties of being red
or being purple. Notice that the non-equivalence of distributional properties to non-
distributional properties requires the mere possibility of gunk with respect to whatever
extension over which the property distributes. If spatial gunk is even possible, then
the distributional property of ranging through a continuous spectrum between dark
red and blue is not necessarily co-extensive with a set of non-distributional colour
properties possessed by any number of points on the surface of the cloth, along with
an arrangement or spatial relation which obtains among these points. It is widely
held that gunk is metaphysically possible. And so not all non-uniform distributional
properties are reducible to non-distributional properties.
These considerations yield a strategy for establishing the irreducibility of distribu-
tional properties:
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gunk To show that some properties non-uniformly distributed over a given exten-
sion are not necessarily co-extensive with any set of non-distributed prop-
erties, show that gunk with respect to that extension is metaphysically
possible.
With this discussion in the background, I turn to the appeal to distributional properties
within the philosophy of time.
4 Distributionalism
Although the above examples of distributed properties involve a distribution over a
spatial extension, the notion of a distributional property is applicable to distributions
over other kinds of extension. In particular, one might view certain properties as
distributed over times. Cameron (2011, p. 63) provides a useful toy example.
Consider a simple world consisting of just one spatial dimension and one tem-
poral dimension. There is one entity in this world – Flatty – who starts off his
life at time t as a point, but who as time progresses grows continuously in one
direction of the one spatial dimension he occupies. After the beginning of this
life, then, he is no longer a point but a line; and at each moment he is a longer line
than he has ever been previously. Exactly one year later, at t*, Flatty tragically
ceases to be, and the world is empty.
Flatty’s life might be described as instantiating a triangular property distributed over
time. Let’s distinguish the distributional property from its point features. Flatty has
various lengths at different moments of his life. Each length is a point feature. Yet
Flatty has one and the same distributional property at each moment of his life. To
give another example, one might view my growing up as the distributional property
of being initially a child and then an adult. I had the point feature of being a child
and now have the point feature of being an adult. But according to the proposal at
hand, I have now one and the same distributional property as I had then, a property of
maturation distributed over time.
Distributional properties have been used in a response to the truthmaker challenge
to presentism. Cameron (2008, 2011) proposes that such properties could serve as
presently existing truthmakers for past truths. My being initially a child and then
an adult is a presently existing property which may serve as a truthmaker for both
the present truth that I am now an adult and the past truth that I was before a child.
Likewise, one might deny that the world presently possesses the tensed property of
once having contained dinosaurs yet hold that the world possesses the presently exist-
ing distributional property of once containing dinosaurs and now lacking dinosaurs.
Past truths supervene on such properties. So the proposal satisfies presentism, past
realism and truthmaker. (As I shall discuss in Sect. 5, Cameron contends that
the proposal conforms to difference making.) Call this position distributionalist
presentism or, for short, distributionalism.
Distributionalism has met with several objections. Merricks (2008, p. 330) objects to
the proposal on the grounds that the presentist must hold that a temporal distributional
property distributes over a non-existing extension:
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presentists should deny that persistence is extension throughout a temporal
region, subregions of which are various times. So they should reject the view
that persisting objects are extended throughout nonexistent regions. (And what
a bad view that would be!)
Merricks does not elaborate why a distribution over a non-existent extension would
be a bad view. Tallant and Ingram (2012a, p. 269) might be read as developing the
objection:
The cost of such a view [i.e., distributionalism] is too high. The distribution
of a property requires a region into which it is to be distributed. Once more:
an object cannot be polka-dotted (or bear the SDP [i.e., spatially distributional
property] being-polka-dotted) without being extended in space. The SDP must
distribute and if there is no spatially extended region of its bearer into which
it can distribute, then the SDP cannot be instantiated. In the same way, a TDP
[i.e., temporal distributional property] can only distribute if its bearer has some
existing temporal extension into which it may distribute. It is a substantial cost
of any thesis if it requires us to deny this.
Tallant and Ingram thus take the distributionalist to be caught in an inconsistency:
temporal distributions require extensions of time, but presentists must deny that there
are such extensions.
Cameron responds that a presentist is already committed to a distribution or exten-
sion over nonexistent periods. For the life of a presently existing persisting object is
extended over a range of time, and the presentist holds that nonpresent times are nonex-
istent. Addressing the objection that temporal distributional properties are distributed
over nonexistent periods, Cameron (2011, p. 72) writes that
the presentist is already committed – simply qua presentist – to denying some-
thing akin to the intuition driving this objection, and so even if it is a cost to deny
it, it’s a cost she has to pay simply to be a presentist: there is no further cost to
being a presentist truthmaker theorist.
Tallant and Ingram (2012a) respond that the commitment of the distributional presen-
tist to distribution over nonexistent regions is not one already incurred by presentism.
They argue that presentism is not inconsistent with the truth
Extended entities exist iff regions exist for them to distribute across but only with
the falsehood
Entities that have existed, exist and will exist do so iff regions exist for them to
distribute into or across.
Tallant and Ingram claim that it is the former thesis which is inconsistent with distrib-
utionalism. Tallant and Ingram are correct that a presentist generally is not committed
to holding that certain properties are distributed over non-existent regions. But they,
along with Merricks and Cameron, are mistaken that the distributionalist is so com-
mitted.
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An analogy with the topic of persistence may be helpful. Although perdurantism is
often presented as the position that things persist by having temporal parts, the mereol-
ogy is dispensable. Mereologies tend to include among axioms weak supplementation:
something is a proper part of a whole only if there is a remainder—that is to say, only if
there exists another proper part of the same whole. So talk of temporal parts suggests
that things persist in virtue of consisting of a succession of distinct existing objects.
But one may be a perdurantist, identifying the persisting thing with a sequence of
distinct objects, without being committed to these objects being parts and so without
being committed to there existing more than one such constituent object. The perdu-
rantist need hold only that what is present at any given moment is not the whole entity.
Things persist in virtue of consisting of a succession of distinct objects; and this is
true even if, at any one time, only one of the objects exists. For this reason, talk of
temporal parts is misleading and inessential to perdurantism. The perdurantist instead
may speak of temporal stages. Such talk is motivated in part by the uncontroversial
observation that stages need not conform to an analogue to weak supplementation. A
process may consist of a succession of stages even if at any given moment only one
stage exists. Notice that, for these reasons, perdurantism is consistent with presentism.
Talk of a distributional property being distributed over an extension is similar. Such
talk suggests that a property is distributional only if there is an existing region over
which the property is distributed. But this talk is dispensible. Just as the perdurantist is
not committed to the mereology implied by talk of temporal parts, so too distribution-
alism is not committed to the existence of regions as implied by talk of extensions. The
distributionalist need only hold that it is one and the same property which, although
instantiated at different times, yields distinct point features. So Merricks and Tallant
and Ingram are wrong to take the question to be whether the distributional property
is extended over nonexistent regions. This is not the nub of the issue. The question
of the suitability of temporal distributional properties is not whether the property
distributes over existent regions. In the next section, I shall argue that the question
is instead the relationship obtaining between the distributional property and certain
non-distributional or uniformly distributional properties.
5 Distributionalism and the challenge
Are temporal distributional properties legitimate truthmakers? Under what conditions
do such properties conform to the prohibition against cheating? In this section, I
shall argue that temporal distributional properties meet this requirement just in case
they are not reducible to non-distributional or uniformly distributional properties.
For readability, let me say that temporal distributional properties are reducible or
irreducible, and leave the reference to that to which they are or are not reducible,
non-distributional or uniformly distributional properties, tacit.
Recall, one interpretation of the prohibition against cheating is difference-
making, the requirement that a truthmaker makes a difference to the intrinsic nature
of the world. First notice that, even if a temporal distributional property reduces to, or
is necessarily co-extensive with, non-distributional or uniformly distributional prop-
erties, then the distributive property can satisfy difference- making. Suppose that
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the distributional property of my being initially a child and then an adult reduces to an
arrangement of the properties of being a child and being an adult. Then the conjunctive
property being initially a child and then an adult satisfies difference- making. For
this reason, temporal distributional properties can satisfy difference- making, and
so be, according to this condition of adequacy, legitimate truthmakers for past truths,
even if they are not irreducible.
However, in our example only the component of being an adult in the distributional
property of my being initially a child and then an adult is a difference maker to my
present intrinsic nature. Furthermore, the truth that I was once a child is explained not
by the distributional property of my being initially a child and then an adult but by
the property of being initially a child, a property which I no longer instantiate. The
property of being initially a child is presently inert. The conjunct of the property that
makes the past claim true (or on which the past truth supervenes) is not the conjunct
that makes a difference to my present intrinsic nature. Moreover, the property of being
initially a child appears to be past directed in the way in which the Lucretian properties
are past directed. Recall, the claim that the world presently instantiates the property of
having contained dinosaurs ascribes to the world a property which points beyond its
instantiation. So too the claim that I currently instantiate the property of being initially
a child appears to ascribe to me a property which points beyond its instantiation. And
so the distributional property, if conjunctive and so reducible, is partly a cheater.
It is due to these considerations that difference- making is not equivalent to a
prohibition against cheating. For a conjunctive property may be both a difference
maker and a cheater, if for example one conjunct satisfies difference- making but
the other points beyond its instances. We can amend the requirement to exclude this
counterexample:
revised difference- making Any truth-functional constituent of a legitimate
truthmaker or supervenience base for truths makes
a difference to the intrinsic nature of the world.
Talk of truth-functional constituents in this context is rough and ready but serves our
purposes. On this way of speaking for example, a binary conjunctive property or an
implicative property both have two constituents. revised difference- making cap-
tures the sense in which temporal distributional properties, if reducible to a conjunction
of non-distributional or uniformly distributional properties, cheat. If my being initially
a child and then an adult consists in part in my being initially a child, then the com-
plex property fails revised difference- making since only one constituent makes
a difference to the world’s intrinsic nature.
Caplan and Sanson (2011, p. 201) hold that the distributionalist fails to satisfy a pro-
hibition against cheating even if the temporal distributional property is irreducible. But
I believe this to be mistaken. Let’s continue our example of maturation. The distribu-
tionalist move is to assert that I am currently an adult not in virtue of instantiating some
non-distributional or uniformly distributional property of adulthood. I am currently
an adult in virtue of instantiating an irreducible non-uniformly distributional property
of maturation. I was once a child in virtue of instantiating the same property. The
property in virtue of which I was once a child is the very property in virtue of which I
am now an adult. So maturation points beyond its instances neither wholly nor in part.
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Irreducible temporal distributional properties satisfy the intuitive gloss on a prohibi-
tion against cheating. Moreover, we have seen that temporal distributional properties
satisfy difference- making. And, since irreducible temporal distributional proper-
ties are themselves atomic properties, they satisfy revised difference- making. So
irreducible temporal distributional properties conform to all of difference- making,
revised difference- making and the intuitive demonstrative guide to a prohibition
against cheating.
These considerations give us good reason to hold that non-uniform temporal dis-
tributional properties satisfy non-cheating requirements only if they are irreducible to
non-distributional and uniformly distributional properties. So the viability of distri-
butionalism, as a solution to the truthmaker objection to presentism, hinges on their
irreducibility.
6 Against distributionalism
Cameron (2011) considers the worry that temporal distributional properties are
reducible to non-distributional properties and, in response, simply stipulates their
irreducibility. Discussing the move of taking a temporal distributional property to be
equivalent to a complex conjunctive property, some conjuncts of which are simple
present tensed properties like is an adult and others of which are the past-directed
properties like was a child, he (2011, p. 70) writes:
The point of appealing to distributional properties is that this move can’t be made.
Distributional properties cannot be broken up into simple components: there is
just one property here, and it is fundamental – and it is exactly the same property
that is grounding truths about how the bearer now is that is grounding truths
about how the bearer was. There is one fundamental property that is involved
both in past settling and in difference making, and so there is no sense in which
we are appealing to a solely past-directed property in our truthmaking.
On what grounds can the distributionalist make this stipulation? It can be difficult to
adjudicate on such matters. One philosopher’s bold conjecture is another’s undefended
assumption. However, in this case the onus is clearly on the distributionalist to defend
the stipulation. Some of our examples of temporally distributed properties appear to
be conjunctive properties and so prima facie not irreducible. For example, the property
of having been a child and being now an adult appears to be explicable in terms of
the properties of being a child and being an adult, along with a temporal arrangement
of these properties.
The characterization of maturation as a binary conjunction of two uniform tem-
poral distributional properties is of course a simplification. Maturation is arguably a
continuous infinite series of point features. Likewise, Flatty’s growth appears to be a
continuous series of line segments. But even if we hesitate to represent such a series
with an infinitary conjunction, a continuous series is reducible to an infinite set of uni-
form distributional or non-distributional properties. It appears, then, that maturation
just is a series of age features, and Flatty’s growth, a series of lengths. I shall return to
the contrast between continuity and what is needed to establish irreducibility in Sect.
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7. For now it suffices to note that the onus is on the distributionalist to provide an
argument for the irreducibility of non-uniform temporal distributional properties.
Parson’s argument that distributional properties are not in general equivalent to non-
distributional properties, is not available to the presentist. Recall, the argument that a
given distributional property is not necessarily co-extensive with a non-distributional
property requires the possibility of gunk with respect to the extension over which the
distributional property distributes. Parson’s examples concern spatial extension. But
the strategy for establishing the irreducibility of a given distributional property, gunk,
ought to be applicable to any kind of extension. The presentist, however, must reject
the possibility of temporal gunk. For presentism is committed to the instantaneity of
existence. What exists, according to the presentist, is temporally unextended. (I shall
modify this claim in Sect. 7.) Were the present to have duration, then the present would
be divisible. And, were the present divisible, it would be divisible into distinct times.
And so some parts of the present would be earlier and others later, since presentists
agree that divisions of temporal regions are ordered by earlier than and later than
relations. It is absurd that some times would be earlier than others, yet both present.
The presentist thus appears committed to the claim that the present is durationless.
I do not know of a good argument against this commitment. Hastevold (2008, p.
331) argues that the present cannot be durationless:
the Presentist should allow that one can presently believe the simple proposition
that one presently exists, but it is dubious … that one can entertain, much less
affirm, the proposition that one presently exists ‘within the space of an instant’;
believing the simplest of propositions seems to ‘take time’.
Perhaps Hastevold’s considerations show that an entity that exists merely for an instant
could not entertain or express the proposition expressed by ‘I presently exist’. Even
this makes an assumption about thought which is not obviously correct. But if we
concede that thoughts can only be entertained over a period of time, this falls short of
establishing that the present has a duration. For surely the proposition that I exist only
at the present instant may be true even if I cannot entertain or subvocalize a belief in
that proposition in an instant. A similar response can be made to McKinnon (2003)
who argues that since neural processes have duration, the presentist is committed to
denying mind-body identity theory.
Others attempt to show that arguments for thin presentism are unpersuasive. Such
arguments are venerable. For example, Augustine argues that were the present to have
duration then it would be divisible into distinct but simultaneous times, on pain of
contradiction. McKinnon (2003, p. 307) reconstructs the argument:
If the present is extended then it has wholly distinct parts and those parts must be
simultaneous. This rests on the assumption that if x and y are both metaphysically
present then they are simultaneous. On the other hand, if the present is extended
then it also seems that its disjoint parts cannot be simultaneous: if x and y are
not temporally overlapping then they are temporally separated and hence, not
simultaneous. Thus we have a reductio of the view that the metaphysical present
is extended.
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McKinnon (2003, p. 318) claims that the Augustinian argument is guilty of an equiv-
ocation: ‘simultaneous’ can mean occurring at the same moment of time or being
distinct parts of the same thick present. McKinnon may be correct that when I speak
of the present, I typically refer to a duration of time; the context of my utterance deter-
mines the extent of this duration. But, for any durational present, the further question
can be asked for any two given parts, is the one part prior to the other? One may
thereby shift the context from the question of simultaneity in the latter sense to that of
the former sense. It is uncontroversial that the latter has duration. The considerations
brought forward by the thick presentist fail to establish that the argument that the
present in the former sense lacks duration is unsound.
Finally, some have held that, although the present lacks duration, presentists are
not committed to the instantaneity of existence. Merricks (2007, p. 124), for example,
holds that the saddling of presentism with the instantaneity thesis is a mistake, writing
that “[p]resentists deny that everything is instantaneous; they think that many objects
not only exist, but also have existed and will exist.” Certainly, presentists accept the
legitimacy of tensed talk. They allow that we can say, for example, ‘Caesar existed’ or
‘Yesterday lasted 24 hours’. But they deny the ordinary reading of these claims, under
which ‘Caesar existed’ carries ontological commitment to Caesar and ‘Yesterday lasted
24 hours’ entails that yesterday had a duration. On the contrary, presentists deny that
past claims carry their ordinary commitments. To put the point somewhat colloquially,
to have existed is not a way of existing but a way of not existing. Presentists have several
options for how to read past and future claims; I shall discuss these in Sect. 7. But
regardless of how presentists interpret past and future claims, they do not have the
option of taking existence to have straightforwardly a duration.
So presentists ought to deny that the temporal extension of objects is possibly
gunky. Indeed, under the plausible assumption that at least some things presently
exist, presentism just is the view that existence is temporally indivisible. As such,
Parson’s argument for the irreducibility of some temporal distributional properties is
unavailable to the presentist. Notice that this objection is not the complaint raised
in Sect. 5, the misplaced worry that temporal distributional properties are distributed
over nonexistent regions. This objection, recall, lapses if the property is not reducible
to an arrangement of nondistributed properties. Rather, the objection of this section
questions not the existence of temporal distributional properties but their irreducibility.
7 Responses and replies
In this section, I shall consider a few responses to the objection raised in Sect. 6.
You claim that the presentist is committed to the present being durationless
or temporally unextended. But one might hold that the present is an extended
simple. Such a present moment would have duration but would not be divisible
into smaller durations. A temporal distributional property might be thought of
as being distributed through such a present.
Notice that embracing the thesis that the present is an extended simple will not allow
the distributionalist to appeal to gunk so to show that temporal distributional proper-
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ties are irreducible. Nothing in the discussion of the previous sections hinged on the
present being unextended. The difficulty for the presentist, however, is not that she is
committed to the present being unextended, but that she is committed to the present
being indivisible. For gunk requires that the dimension or extension over which a
distributional property is distributed is possibly gunky: it is possible that each part of
that extension itself has at least one proper part. But if the present is either necessarily
durationless or necessarily indivisible, then this premise of the argument, applied to
the extension of time, is false.
Nonetheless, the distributionalist who holds that the present is an extended simple
has available to her an alternative strategy for establishing that there are irreducibly
distributional temporal properties. For a presently existing property may be distributed
over the extended but indivisible present. And indeed, as such properties would be
extended over an indivisible duration, they would not be reducible to nondistributional
properties. However, this strategy will not help the distributionalist to provide presently
existing truthmakers for past claims. For taking the present to be an extended simple
only shows that there may be irreducibly distributional properties distributed over the
extended but indivisible duration of any one moment, not that the properties distributed
over a divisible duration of time are irreducible. And it is only these latter properties
which can provide presently existing truthmakers for past claims.
One might endorse presentism, and so hold that the only existing objects are
presently existing objects, but deny that the only time which exists is the instan-
taneous present. Then the strategy of gunk is available to the distributionalist.
One way of cashing out this position is as follows: hold that time is temporally gunky
but there is a minimal interval of time during which an object can exist. Call such
an interval a minimum. Minima have temporal parts all the way down: any tempo-
ral part of a minimum has itself temporal parts. However, no object can exist during
only a proper part of a minimum. The metaphysical possibility of objects having a
minimal duration of existence is not implausible. On this view, all properties are tem-
porally distributed over at least a minimum. Since the minima are allegedly possible,
distributional properties do not necessarily reduce to non-distributional properties.
This response will not help the distributionalist. The view that there are minima and
that all objects exist solely during the present minima (while perhaps having existed
earlier and yet will exist later) is consistent with the claim that the only existing
objects are presently existing objects. But these objects occupying the present minima
typically also exist in the very recent past and future. Compare this situation with the
view that all objects exist at all times. Here too the only existing objects are presently
existing objects but objects also exist in the past and the future. And so an argument to
show that distributional properties are not in general equivalent to non-distributional
properties, is still not available to the presentist.
Suppose that I have the property of being first a child and then an adult. This
property, given my age, determines that I am now an adult. This is not equivalent
to just possessing the property of being an adult now. For I possess the distri-
butional property over a region of time which includes the present. Take any
subregion that also includes the present. The subregion is an extended period
123
3440 Synthese (2014) 191:3427–3446
or duration of time that is a proper part of the original region. That subregion
can itself be divided into proper parts, one of which contains the present. So no
matter how small a period of time surrounding the present one considers, over
which my maturation property is spread, we can choose a smaller period of time
surrounding the present, over which my maturation property is spread. These
regions of time are largely composed of nonexistent periods of time, but they
all include the present. And the distributional presentist, as has already been
noted, should not be worried that certain properties are as it were distributed
over nonexistent regions.
This response confuses continuity with gunkiness. The feature canvassed is that no
matter how small an extension one considers, over which the property distributes and
which includes a given point, we can choose a smaller extension, over which the
property distributes and which also includes that point. This feature is not gunkiness.
An extension is gunky just in case any part of that extension has proper parts. Moreover,
continuity cannot replace gunkiness in an argument for the irreducibility of temporal
distributional properties. The presentist may allow that, loosely speaking, the present
minute is a part of the present hour. But a presentist, I have argued, is committed to
holding that the present strictly speaking is an indivisible instant.
The ersatz presentist can appeal to the strategy gunk so to establish that tem-
poral distributional properties are irreducible to uniform distributional or non-
distributional properties. Ersatz presentists hold that expressions apparently
referring to past times and past objects in fact refer to abstract objects represent-
ing past times and objects. Such abstracta are ordered by relations analogous to
the earlier than, later than and simultaneous with relations—merely analogous
to these relations since, of course, the ersatz past objects are not themselves
times and so do not stand in temporal relations.
The appeal to ersatz ‘times’ is not, I believe, the strategy labeled gunk, since gunk
appeals to times, real times, the sort you can be on, waste or have the best of your life,
not abstract objects. Ersatzists of course claim that talk of past times just is talk of
abstracta. But this claim may be taken in one of several ways; no version of ersatzism
will help the distributionalist.
One version of ersatzism is presentist fictionalism. Lewis (1986, p. 203–204) can-
vasses this kind of presentism as a response to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics;
on this line:
the only intrinsic properties of a thing are those it has at the present moment.
Other times are like false stories; they are abstract representations, composed out
of the materials of the present, which represent or misrepresent the way things
are. When something has different intrinsic properties according to one of these
ersatz times, that does not mean that it, or any part of it, or anything else, just
has them.
Such ersatzists take claims about the past to be fictions and so, strictly speaking,
false. Since fictionalists deny past realism, they have no need for presently existing
truthmakers for past claims. Fictionalism is not an option for the distributionalist.
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According to a second version of ersatzism in the philosophy of time, there are truths
about the past but such truths carry little existential commitments. Such a presentist
views true past claims as true representations of the way things were. We require
presently existing objects to represent past objects, but the truths are not made true by
such abstracta. Merricks (2007) may be this kind of presentist. Such presentists reject
truthmaker and so of course do not need temporal distributional properties.
A third version of ersatzism in the philosophy of time is exemplified by such authors
as Bourne (2006) and Crisp (2007), who hold that past claims are true and are made true
by the presently existing abstracta which represent past objects. Past truths supervene
on such abstracta. Such presentists accept all of presentism, truthmaker and past
realism. But since such ersatzists have truthmakers available to them, they also need
no truck with distributional properties.4
According to a somewhat similar variant of presentism, past objects are presently
existing nonconcrete objects. Linsky and Zalta (1994, 1996) and Williamson (1998)
develop such a line in the metaphysics of modality. I might have had a sister. This truth
is grounded, on this view, on an actually existing nonconcrete object which possesses
the modal property of possibly being both a concrete object and my sister. Williamson
(1998, pp. 265–266) canvasses applying such a strategy to the philosophy of time. On
this line, a merely past object such as Caesar presently exists but is no longer concrete.
Unlike the views of Bourne (2006) and Crisp (2007), this position is not a version of
ersatzism, since the presently existing abstract Caesar is numerically identical with
the formerly concrete, living and breathing, person. But such presentists also have
readily available truthmakers for past truths, and so do not need to appeal to temporal
distributional properties.5
You have argued that it is not available for the presentist to hold that time is
gunky, since presentism is committed to the instantaneity of the present. But we
might view the presentist as only making a claim about what is actually the case.
Such a version of presentism is consistent with the possibility of temporal gunk.
In this response, my interlocutor motivates the irreducibility of distributional properties
from an alternative view of the modal status of presentism. The position is unortho-
dox. A standard view among metaphysicians is that a metaphysical claim, if true,
is necessarily true. There is, however, growing interest in this nonstandard approach
to the modal status of metaphysical claims: Rosen (2006) and Miller (2009, 2010),
for example, argue that certain metaphysical theses are contingently true. Cameron
(2007) himself argues that some truths about composition are contingent. And others
embrace contingentism about time. Bourne (2006, p. 220–230), for example, argues
that although A-theory is actually true, there are metaphysically possible worlds where
temporal events are merely B-related.
This is the most promising line of response for the distributionalist. I have argued
that the distributionalist must show that the talk of temporal distributional properties
4 Caplan and Sanson (2010) argue that such abstracta do not ground past truths and so this version of
ersatzism fails a truthmaker requirement stronger than truthmaker.
5 For discussion of the contingently nonconcrete, see Bennett (2006) and Nelson and Zalta (2009).
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is not simply short hand for talk of nondistributional or uniformly distributional prop-
erties. To show this, it suffices to establish that temporal distributional properties are
not necessarily equivalent to nondistributional or uniformly distributional properties.
And I have raised doubts about whether the presentist who holds that presentism
is necessarily true can establish this. But grant for the moment that presentism is
contingently true. Then it seems that the contingent distributionalist can establish that
temporal distributional properties are not necessarily equivalent to nondistributional
or uniformly distributional properties, since she is free to hold that there are nonactual
but metaphysically possible worlds where time is gunky and not everything is present.
In this way, the contingent distributionalist can make a straightforward appeal to gunk
in order to offer a presently existing truthmaker which conforms to revised differ-
ence making. So a take-away from this article is that one can reconcile presentism
and truthmaker in this fashion by holding that presentism is contingently true.
However, I hesitate to conclude that a presentist ought to be a distributionalist. For
contingent presentism faces considerable challenges.
One such challenge is to explain our epistemic access to metaphysical truths, if
contingent. Metaphysics appears to be largely an activity from the armchair. Yet it
is unclear how one could come to know contingent truths by such a method. Rosen
sketches one kind of response to this challenge.6 He argues that correctly conceiv-
able worlds (roughly: conceivable worlds where the actual a posteriori necessities are
true) are metaphysical possible worlds yet correct conception underdetermines many
metaphysical positions. Metaphysical theories are determined instead in part by such a
priori theoretic desiderata as economy, fecundity, plausibility and immunity to coun-
terexample. So Rosen holds that certain metaphysical theses are contingent a priori
truths, of a kind distinct from considerations of indexicality or reference-stipulation.
To develop this line may yield a satisfying response to the epistemic challenge.
But even if the contingent presentist can meet this first challenge, she cannot
straightforwardly use gunk to show that temporal distributional properties are irre-
ducible. Here’s why. Even the contingent presentist ought to accept that metaphysical
truths are nomologically necessary.7 Just as a true physical theory defines what is
physically possible, so too an actually true metaphysical thesis delineates a space of
worlds where that thesis is true. The contingent presentist holds that there are correctly
conceivable worlds that lie outside this space. But from these considerations, gunk is
ambiguous between two senses of metaphysical possibility, a notion of what is pos-
sible according to the actual metaphysical truths, analogous to scientific nomological
possibility, and a notion of what is correctly conceivable. We might disambiguate as
follows:
narrow gunk To show that some properties non-uniformly distributed over a
given extension are not necessarily co-extensive with any set
of non-distributed properties, show that gunk with respect to
that extension is metaphysically possible according to the actual
metaphysical truths.
6 For an alternative approach to the epistemology of contingent metaphysical truths, see Miller (2010).
7 For criticism of this construal of metaphysical necessity, see Williams (2006).
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broad gunk To show that some properties non-uniformly distributed over a
given extension are not necessarily co-extensive with any set of
non-distributed properties, show that gunk with respect to that
extension is correctly conceivable.
Of course, to unpack narrow and broad gunk would require fuller explication
of what constitutes metaphysical truth and correct conception. But suppose for the
moment that these two notions of necessity diverge.
It is narrow gunk which is the relevant variant of a strategy to establish that
temporal distributional properties are irreducible. Let me pursue a little further the
analogy between scientific and metaphysical necessity. Notice that those properties
are irreducible within natural science which are necessarily irreducible according to
a scientific-nomological construal of necessity. That is to say, a property P is not
reducible to Q, according to physical science, just in case P and Q are not exten-
sionally equivalent in some world where the actual physical laws hold. By anal-
ogy, one might well hold that those properties are irreducible within metaphysics
which are necessarily irreducible according to the metaphysical–nomological con-
strual of necessity. That is to say, a property P is not reducible to Q, according to
metaphysics, just in case P and Q are not extensionally equivalent in some world
where the actual metaphysical truths obtain. If this is correct, then it is the narrower
notion of necessity which is relevant to establishing the metaphysical irreducibility of
a property.
But moreover it seems plausible that presentism, if true, is a metaphysical truth.
The relevant worlds for establishing the irreducibility of a temporal distributional
property are then those worlds where presentism is true. Correctly conceivable worlds
where presentism is false are irrelevant for establishing the irreducibility of a temporal
distributional property. And so it is narrow gunk which is relevant to establishing
whether a temporal distributional property is irreducible. And, for the reasons given
in Sect. 6, temporal distributional properties cannot be established as irreducible by
the strategy of narrow gunk.
The distributionalist might respond in one of two ways. She might deny that pre-
sentism, if true, is a metaphysical truth. Or she might argue against the argument just
sketched so to defend the claim that it is broad gunk which is relevant to establish-
ing the metaphysical irreducibility of a temporal distributional property. I cannot here
develop in full the argument sketched above that it is the nomological construal, and not
correct conception, which provides the more fruitful characterization of metaphysical
necessity. And so I do not claim that the distributionalist cannot respond to the chal-
lenge truthmaker poses for presentism by embracing the view that presentism
is contingently true. But I do hold that merely showing that there is a sense in which
presentism is contingent does not suffice to establish the viability of distributionalism.
There is more work to be done.
Here’s a final response.
You merely show that gunk, one strategy for establishing the irreducibility of
distributional properties, is unavailable to the presentist. She may employ some
other strategy or simply stipulate their irreducibility.
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True, I have not shown that the presentist is committed to denying that temporal dis-
tributional properties are irreducible. But I have argued in Sect. 6 that distributional
properties prima facie appear to be equivalent to non-distributional or uniformly dis-
tributional properties. For example, the property of having been a child and being now
an adult appears to be explicable in terms of the properties of being a child and being
an adult, along with an arrangement of these properties. And although having been
a child and being now an adult is but a toy example, the appearance of reducibility
is easily extended. For example, Flatty’s growth appears to be a series of lengths.
So stipulation of the irreducibility of temporal distributional properties is prima facie
unpersuasive.
The distributionalist might respond that her move just is to stipulate that, despite
appearances to the contrary, temporal distributional properties are irreducible. Gener-
ally, stipulation is a less than ideal philosophical strategy. For one thing, stipulation
would not persuade one opposed to the distributionalist’s position that distributional-
ism is true. But it may seem to the reader that the stipulation that temporal distributional
properties are irreducible is not intended to persuade anyone of the truth of distribution-
alism. Rather, the stipulation is aimed to show that presentism and truthmaker can
be reconciled without running afoul of a prohibition against cheating such as revised
difference making. And so even if the stipulation of the truth of distributionalism
does not on its own provide positive reasons to be a distributionalist, the stipulation
that temporal distributional properties are irreducible can show that the challenge to
presentism posed by truthmaker can be met.
I believe that the stipulation cannot respond adequately to the challenge to presen-
tism posed by truthmaker. For the stipulation is of a kind with a clearly unpersuasive
line of reponse to the challenge, the assertion that Lucretian properties are not cheaters.
The distributionalist may respond that there is a salient difference between the two
cases. In the one case, Lucretian properties are stipulated as making an intrinsic differ-
ence in the world; in the other case, temporal distributional properties are stipulated
to be irreducible. The former case is clearly an unhappy response to the objection
that Lucretian properties do not appear to make a difference in the world and so are
cheaters. It may seem that the latter case is not the same kind of simple denial—that
it is not the mere stipulation that tensed properties are non-cheaters. But either stipu-
lation has this immediate consequence. The stipulation that Lucretian properties are
difference makers simply is the stipulation that they are not cheaters, given the relation
between difference making and cheaters, which I argued for in Sect. 5. So too the stip-
ulation that temporal distributional properties are irreducible simply is the stipulation
that they are not cheaters, given the relation between reducibility and cheaters, which
I argued for in Sect. 5. For these reasons, the stipulation that temporal distributional
properties are irreducible is unpersuasive as a response to the challenge truthmaker
poses for presentism.
To make the point differently, grant for the sake of argument that the stipulation is an
adequate response to the challenge. If I am right that the stipulation that temporal distri-
butional properties are irreducible is of a kind with the stipulation that Lucretian prop-
erties are difference makers, then the stipulation that temporal distributional properties
are irreducible undercuts the motivation for distributionalism. For were it permissible
to to stipulate that temporal distributional properties are irreducible, then it would be
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no less permissible to stipulate that Lucretian properties are difference makers. But if
it is permissible to stipulate that Lucretian properties are difference makers, then the
Lucretian can meet the challenge truthmaker poses for presentism, and there is no
reason to embrace distributionalism. For these reasons, the stipulation that temporal
distributional properties are irreducible is either unpersuasive or self-defeating.
Let’s sum up. A presentist who wishes to appeal to distributional properties so to give
an analysis of change or to provide presently existing truthmakers for past claims may
respond by giving us an account of presentism which is not committed to solely instan-
taneous or temporally indivisible existents. Or she may give us another argument to
show that non-uniformly distributional properties are not in general equivalent to non-
distributional or uniformly distributional properties, one which does not rely on the
possibility of gunk. Or she may defend the nonstandard view that presentism is con-
tingently true against the objections raised above. Or she may defend the move of stipu-
lating the irreducibility of temporal distributional properties. But in our current state of
understanding on these issues, we ought to conclude that the attempted reconciliation
of presentism and truthmaker theory by appeal to distributional properties fails.
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